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INTRODUCTION

On June 24, 2011, Governor Andrew Cuomo signed the Marriage

Equality Act, extending the right to marry to same-sex couples in the
state of New York.'

As a concession to secure a floor vote and the

necessary Republican votes, the final bill contained several religious
exemptions and an inseverability clause.2 If a court were to strike

t B.A., Cornell University, 2008; Candidate forJ.D., Cornell Law School, 2013; Articles Editor, Cornell Law Review, Volume 98. 1 would like to thank Professor Michael Dorf
for his invaluable advice on this Note. I am also very grateful to my family for their endless
patience, to my friends and classmates Antonio Haynes and Ross Thomas for their gentle
criticism and calming dispositions, and to my partner Alex for his superb insights and
encouragement. I would also like to thank the editors, associates, and support staff of
Cornell Law Review.
1 Marriage Equality Act, ch. 95, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 749 (McKinney); Nicholas Confessore & Michael Barbaro, New York Allows Same-Sex Marriage,Becoming Largest State to Pass
Law, N.Y. TIMEs, June 25, 2011, at Al.
2 See Michael Barbaro, How the Same-Sex MarriageDeal Nearly Collapsed, N.Y. TIMES Cny
Room BLoG (June 27, 2011 9:32 AM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/27/
how-the-same-sex-marriage-deal-nearly-collapsed/
("Without those exemptions, I'm having
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down the exemptions, or any other part of the bill, the inseverability
clause would be triggered and the entire law invalidated, same-sex
marriage and all.
A leading activist opposing same-sex marriage and at least one
commentator have suggested that these exemptions are unlikely ever
to face serious challenge in court.3 But although the protections do
not reach very far beyond the Free Exercise Clause, they do reach
beyond it, and there is at least one plausible scenario that could lead
to their invalidation. 4 Furthermore, until now, inseverability clauses
have been relatively rare, and scholars and courts have seldom
squarely addressed them.5 This high-profile, contentious legislation is
as likely a vehicle as any for a judicial decision frankly addressing the
byzantine difficulties presented by inseverability clauses. In a world of
infinite factual permutations and a law which "must be stable and
yet . . . cannot stand still,"6 one ought to hesitate to say that what
should not occur shall not occur. This Note examines the New York
Marriage Equality Act's inseverability clause and the mechanics of its
operation in the event it is triggered by the invalidation of the religious exemptions.
The Marriage Equality Act, which faced an uncertain fate in a
Republican-controlled New York State Senate, passed narrowly in the
wake of prominent and protracted debates within the state legislature
a hard time supporting this measure . . . ." (quoting Senate Republican Mark Grisanti)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Inseverability clauses serve to invalidate an entire
statute should a court hold any provision of that statute invalid. By contrast, severability
clauses instruct a court that has held portions of a statute invalid to sever the invalid provisions and allow the valid provisions to remain operative. See Israel E. Friedman, Inseverability Clauses in Statutes, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 903, 903 (1997).
3
See Jon Campbell, What's Next for Gay Couples? Marriage Ceremonies Start July 24,
WGRZ.com (June 26, 2011, 2:59 PM), http://www.wgrz.com/rss/article/125791/37/
Whats-Next-For-Gay-Couples-Marriage-Ceremonies-Start-July-24 ("[National Organization
for Marriage President Brian] Brown said he doesn't foresee any lawsuits on the bill itself,
in part because he doesn't believe the religious exemptions have much strength. 'Because
the language itself is not particularly strong-it's not strong at all-I don't see how a court
overturns it . . . .'); Michael Dorf, The Puzzling Insistence on a Non-Severability Clause,
DORF ON LAw (June 27, 2011, 12:37 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2011/06/puzzlinginsistence-on-non-severability.html ("Let's think about the reasons why the religious exemptions might be 'adjudged . . . invalid' by a court. I can come up with two possibilities,
one of which seems extremely unlikely, and the other of which seems remotely possible but
self-defeating." (omission in original)). But see Dan Wiessner &Jessica Dye, Fearof Lawsuits
from New York Gay MarriageMay Be Overblown, REUTERs, June 22, 2011, available at http://
www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/22/us-gaymarriage-newyork-exemptions-idUSTRE75L
5EQ20110622 (quoting an attorney for the New York Catholic Archdiocese who predicted
"years of litigation on individual cases at all levels of govermnent").
4
See infra Part II.
5 Fred Kameny, Are Inseverability Clauses Constitutional?, 68 ALB. L. REv. 997, 1002 &
n.29 (2005) (remarking that inseverability clauses are infrequently used or studied and
noting that the only previous scholarship devoted exclusively to the subject was a single
student note).
6 RoscoE POUND, INTERPReTATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 1 (1923).
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and national media. 7 Religious groups opposed to same-sex marriage
relied heavily upon rhetoric of religious freedom, invoking fears that
their organizations and congregants would be forced by law to solemnize or provide services for same-sex marriages in contravention of
their beliefs.8 Governor Cuomo, who served as an indispensable unifying force in the effort to achieve passage,9 was by many accounts
solicitous of religious groups' concerns. 1 0
The final bill contained several provisions intended to mollify
those who perceived a threat to religious freedom. First, the bill
broadly exempts religious organizations and affiliated nonprofits from
civil liability or punishment by local and state agencies for refusing to
provide services or facilities for the solemnization of a marriage."
Second, notwithstanding state and local nondiscrimination laws, a religious organization or affiliated nonprofit retains the right to discriminate in favor of its own adherents in employment and housing
decisions and to "takie] such action as is calculated .

.

. to promote

the religious principles for which it is established . . . .12 Third, the
bill includes an inseverability clause directing that the entire bill shall
be invalid if a court strikes down any part of it.13
For weeks, New York State Senate Republicans wrestled uneasily
with the decision of whether to allow a floor vote on the Marriage
Equality Act.14 Observers can only speculate as to precisely why they
7
See Confessore & Barbaro, supra note 1; Dan Wiessner, New York Lawmakers Debate
Allowing Gay Marriage, REUTERS, June 16, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/06/16/us-newyork-gaymarriage-idUSTRE75F61320110616 (stating that lobbyists from both sides and celebrities such as Cynthia Nixon headed to Albany to lobby
lawmakers).
8 See Paul Vitello, Faith Groups Campaign to Block Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, May 6,
2011, at A23 (discussing religious liberty concerns of several denominations, including the
concern that the legalization of same-sex marriage could endanger the ability of religious
groups to provide "social services, like foster care and adoption").
9 See Michael Barbaro, Behind Gay Marriage,an Unlikely Mix ofForces, N.Y. TIMES, June
26, 2011, at Al (revealing in detail the behind-the-scenes lobbying efforts of Governor
Andrew Cuomo).
N.Y. State S., Reg. Sess., OPEN LEGIs. (June 24, 2011), http://open.nysenate.gov/
10
legislation/transcript/regular-session-06-24-2011 (session transcript) ("And let me first say
I would be remiss if I didn't acknowledge the very active role of Governor Cuomo. He was
not merely active but certainly sensitive, both to the dual issues of religious freedoms and
the importance of equality in terms of the purposes of this bill." (statement of Sen. Stephen M. Saland)).
I
Act of June 24, 2011, ch. 96, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 751, 751 (McKinney) (regarding
ability to marry).

12

1&

Id at 752.
See Barbaro, supra note 9 (reporting that Republican polling in their critical counties suggested "little political rationale for legalizing [same-sex marriage]" but that several
Republican senators yielded to familial pressure to support the bill amid a fractured caucus
with timid leadership); see also Glenn Blain & Kenneth Lovett, Altaring History! State
Lawmakers OK Gay Marriageby Vote of 33-29, N.Y. DAILY NEws, June 25, 2011, at 6 (reporting
that Republican senators "agonized" for weeks, culminating in a six-hour closed-door meet13
14
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chose to allow the vote to proceed.1 5 However, if we are to take the
senators at their word, it is clear that the religious exemptions and the
inseverability clause were crucial to securing both a floor vote and the
necessary Republican votes on the final bill.16 We may safely conclude
that the senators who demanded the inclusion of an inseverability
clause feared the possibility of a court striking down the religious exemptions and leaving same-sex marriage intact.17
Nevertheless, it is clear that the religious exemptions and the inseverablity clause did little to mollify most of the senators and religious groups leading the opposition.18 Those groups had pressed for
ing where some members opposed a vote on grounds of moral opposition or favored deciding the issue by popular referendum, while many others favored allowing the vote so as
to dispose of the issue well before the 2012 elections).
15
See Blain & Lovett, supra note 14, for several possibilities.
16 The Republican Senate Majority Leader said as much. Press Release, Sen.
Dean Skelos, N.Y. State Senate (June 24, 2011), http://www.nysenate.gov/press-release/
statement-senate-majority-leader-dean-skelos-7 ("The entire Senate Republican Conference
was insistent that amendments be made to the Governor's original bill in order to protect
the rights of religious institutions and not-for-profits .... ). A key Republican vote in favor
of the bill also emphasized the importance of the exemptions and nonseverability to the
deliberations. N.Y. State S., Reg. Sess., OPEN LEGIs. (June 24, 2011), http://open.nysenate.
gov/legislation/transcript/regular-session-06-24-201 1 (session transcript) ("This language
[of the exemptions and inseverability clause] was the product of lengthy and at times challenging negotiations." (statement of Sen. Stephen M. Saland)); see also Barbaro, supra note
2 (noting the significance of the exemptions to Republican Senator Mark Grisanti).
17
Senator Stephen Saland, a crucial Republican defector who ultimately voted in
favor of the bill, explained the inseverability clause as if it were part and parcel of the
religious protections. After explaining the religious exemptions, he moved to inseverability: "[L]astly and every bit as importantly, and perhaps even most importantly, there
is ... an inseverability clause." N.Y. State S., Reg. Sess., OPEN LEGIS. (June 24, 2011), http:/
/open.nysenate.gov/legislation/transcript/regular-session-06-24-201 1 (session transcript).
During the floor vote, no senator explicitly linked the inseverability clause to the exemptions, but in an earlier statement to reporters, Senate Majority Leader Skelos squarely addressed the issue: "We have concerns that if you're truly going to protect religious
institutions, the issue of severability. You could have a federal judge come in, knock out all
the religious protections, and you could still have the gay marriage. So we're working to
protect religious protections to make sure that they are solid and that they will stand, and I
think that's critically important as part of these negotiations." Nick Reisman, Skelos: Religious ProtectionsBeing Worked on, Capital Tonight, YNN (June 20, 2011, 4:40 PM), http://www.
capitaltonight.com/2011/06/skelos-religious-protections-being-worked-on/ [hereinafter
Skelos] (including video interview of Sen. Skelos).
18 See N.Y. State S., Reg. Sess., OPEN LEGIS. (June 24, 2011), http://open.nysenate.
gov/legislation/transcript/regular-session-0624-2011 (session transcript) ("I just have a release from the Catholic Conference that says that the matter of a religious exemption has
been and continues to be a secondary issue that in no way negates the fact that this bill is
bad for society." (statement of Sen. Ruben Diaz)); Jose Bayona & Christina Boyle, Religious
Leaders Bash Gay MarriageLaw, Vow to Ban Pols Who Supported Measure, NYDAiLYNEws.coM
(June 26, 2011), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-06-26/local/297241261...gay
marriage-law-religious-leaders-catholic-schools ("I believe the passage of same-sex marriage
is another 'nail in the coffin' of marriage." (quoting Bishop Nicholas DiMarzio, diocese of
Brooklyn) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Timothy M. Dolan et al., Statement of the
Bishops of New York State on Same-Sex "Maniage"Vote, N.Y. STATE CATH. CONF., http://www.
nyscatholic.org/2011/06/statement-of-the-bishops-of-new-york-state-on-same-sex-marriage-
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even broader religious protections that would have allowed, for example, individuals and for-profit businesses to discriminate for religious
reasons.' 9 Moreover, several Republican senators voted for the religious exemptions but not the final bill legalizing same-sex marriage. 20
Indeed, several influential opposition groups and activists have stated
that no amount of religious protection would convince them that enacting same-sex marriage is good for society.2 '
To date, the legal controversy surrounding the bill has not concerned the religious exemptions or inseverability language. First, and
entirely irrelevant here, activist groups opposing same-sex marriage
have challenged the closed-door meetings and expedited voting procedure leading to the bill's passage. 22 Second, several town clerks
vote/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2012) ("[W]e . .. affirm that marriage is the joining of one man
and one woman .

. .

. This definition cannot change, though we realize that our beliefs

about the nature of marriage will continue to be ridiculed, and that some will even now
attempt to enact government sanctions against churches and religious organizations that
preach these timeless truths.").
19

Thomas Kaplan, Settled in Albany, Gay MarriageIs Still DrawingOpposition, N.Y. TIMES,

July 13, 2011, at A20 ("[Oipponents of same-sex marriage predicted complications for
wedding industry professionals like caterers, photographers or florists, who might not want
to provide their services to gay couples but fear legal repercussions for refusing. The opponents had sought to include protections in the same-sex marriage legislation for private
bridal-related businesses, but did not succeed.").
20 N.Y. State S., Reg. Sess., OPEN LEGIS. (June 24, 2011), http://open.nysenate.gov/
legislation/transcript/regular-session-06-24-201 1 (session transcript) ("While I will not be
voting for the bill in chief, I will be voting for this because of the importance of the exemptions that were placed into the main body of law by this amendment." (statement of Sen.
Kemp Hannon)). Compare N.Y. State S. Floor Vote on An Act to Amend the Domestic
Relations Law, Reg. Sess., OPEN LEGIS. (June 24, 2011), http://open.nysenate.gov/
legislation/bill/A8520-2011 (indicating that Republican Senators Hannon, Marcellino,
and Skelos voted for the religious exemptions), with N.Y. State S. Floor Vote on the Marriage Equality Act, Reg. Sess., OPEN Lecis. (June 24, 2011) http://open.nysenate.gov/
legislation/bill/A8354-2011 (indicating that Republican Senators Hannon, Marcellino,
and Skelos voted against the final bill).
21

E.g., Frequently Asked Questions About the Defense of Marriage,U.S. CONF. CATH. Bis--

ops, http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/marriage-and-family/marriage/promotionand-defense-of-marriage/frequently-asked-questions-on-defense-of-marriage.cfm#rl7 (last
visited Sept. 22, 2012) ("[N]o religious exemption-no matter how broadly worded-can
justify a supportive or neutral position on the redefinition of marriage. Such 'redefinition'
is always fundamentally unjust, and indeed, religious exemptions may even facilitate the
passage of such unjust laws. Protectingmarriageprotects religious liberty; the two are inseparable."
(citation omitted)); see also Cheryl Wetzstein, Religious GroupsFearLegal Falloutfrom N.Y. Gay

Law, WASH. TIMEs,July 6, 2011, at A7, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2011/jul/5/religious-groups-fear-legal-fallout-from-nygay-la/?page=all ("The ... religious
exemptions are 'a complete and total fraud,' said Paul Atanasio, an officer of the Conservative Party of New York State (CPNYS). A fundamental precept of the Catholic faith is that
'marriage was given to us . . as a sacrament by our Lord Jesus Christ,' he said." (second
omission in original)).
22 Thomas Kaplan, Judge Says Suit to Void MarriageAct May Proceed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30,
2011, at A28 ("Acting Justice Robert B. Wiggins ... wrote that it was possible that the
Republican majority in the State Senate had violated the state's open meetings law as it
discussed whether to bring the marriage bill to a vote.").
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have refused to issue marriage licenses on moral or religious grounds,
raising the question of whether they may be compelled to issue licenses by their supervisors or by state law.2 3 While on first blush these
clerks' religious objections seem relevant, it is clear that a municipal
clerk's office is not a "religious organization" within the meaning of
the statutory exemptions. 2 4 These clerks would have to look elsewhere for legal support.
This Note proceeds in five parts, exploring the operation of the
New York marriage law's inseverability clause in light of the legal and
scholarly debate regarding this type of clause and religious exemptions. Part I explores the general legal landscape governing religious
exemptions to otherwise applicable laws. Part II proposes a scenario
that might plausibly lead a court to strike down the religious exemptions of the Marriage Equality Act, thus triggering its inseverability
clause. Part III investigates the conceptual difficulties posed by the
triggering of various types of inseverability clauses. Part IV explores
several possible judicial solutions in the event that circumstances trigger the inseverability clause of the Marriage Equality Act. Part V concludes by evaluating the normative and political desirability of these
judicial solutions.
I
THE

RELIGIOUs

EXEMPTIONS

The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides the
most foundational baseline of religious exemptions from otherwise
valid laws. For example, a state may not interfere with ecclesiastical
matters such as the selection of clergy and lay employees who perform
religious functions.2 5 Courts may examine discrimination claims of
23

The most high-profile case involves Rose Belforti of the town of Ledyard, who
hoped to continue in herjob by delegating the responsibility of issuing licenses to same-sex
couples to another clerk. Two other clerks in the state resigned rather than comply with
the Marriage Equality Act. When asked for comment on the resignations, Governor
Cuomo responded, "When you enforce the laws of the state, you don't get to pick and
choose." Thomas Kaplan, Rights Collide as Town Clerk Sidesteps Role in Gay Marriages,N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 28, 2011, at Al.

24 SeeAct ofJune 24, 2011, ch. 96, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 751, 751 (McKinney). The Act
applies the religious exception to:
[any] religious entity as defined under the education law or section two of
the religious corporations law, or a corporation incorporated under the
benevolent orders law or described in the benevolent orders law but
formed under any other law of this state, or a not-for-profit corporation
operated, supervised, or controlled by a religious corporation, or any employee thereof, being managed, directed, or supervised by or in conjunction with a religious corporation, benevolent order, or a not-for-profit
corporation as described in this subdivision.
Id.
25 See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
713 (1976) ("[A] civil court must accept the ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as
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lay employees to determine whether they perform a religious function
in the organization. If they do not, a state law prohibiting discrimina26
tion against them would not present a First Amendment problem.
Federal and state nondiscrimination statutes frequently go beyond the baseline protections of the First Amendment and provide
additional exemptions. For example, under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, religious schools may discriminate in employment
based on religion but not race, sex, or national origin.2 7 Currently, of
course, Title VII does not prohibit employers from discriminating
based on sexual orientation or gender identity. 28
New York's nondiscrimination statute does prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation,29 but the statute includes a religious
it finds them."); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N.
Am., 344 U.S. 94, 107-08 (1952) ("Legislation that regulates church administration, the
operation of the churches, the appointment of clergy . . . prohibits the free exercise of
religion."); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (1 Wall.) 679, 710 (1871) ("(C]ivil courts being confined to 'civil actions,' they may not take cognizance of purely spiritual or ecclesiastical
questions.").
26 See, e.g., EEOC v. Sw. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 284 (5th Cir. Unit
A July 1981) (holding that a labor dispute did not implicate First Amendment concerns
because the workers were "not engaged in activities traditionally considered ecclesiastical
or religious," although they were nominally ordained ministers), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905
(1982); Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1368
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("[W]e are dealing with the discharge of a typist-receptionist, not a minister. Nothing in the record indicates that . . . the relationship between the church and its
clerical help touches so close to the heart of church administration as to be protected by
the First Amendment . . . ."). Note that in a recent case, Hosanna-TaborEvangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), the Supreme Court significantly
strengthened this First Amendment protection by recognizing a "ministerial exception"
exempting religious employers from employment discrimination suits relating to the selection of ministers. The Court held that an employee was a minister within the exception
despite the fact that the majority of her duties were secular, where she was ordained as a
minister and, "[a]s a source of religious instruction," "reflected a role in conveying the
Church's message and carrying out its mission." Id. at 708.
27 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2) (2006); Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d
651, 658 (6th Cir. 2000); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d
1164, 1166 (4th Cir. 1985); see also § 2000e-1(a) (providing an exception for religious
organizations "with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to
perform work connected with the carrying on by such [religious organization] of its
activities").
28 Members of Congress have perennially proposed to amend Title VII to include
sexual orientation and, more recently, gender identity in a bill colloquially known as the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA). See William B. Rubenstein, Do Gay Rights
Laws Matter?: An Empirical Assessment, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 65, 69-72 (2001); Chris Geidner,
ENDA Introduced-with 92 Fewer Co-Sponsors than at the End of the 111th Congress, METRO
4
/endaWEEKLY (Apr. 6, 2011, 9:05 PM), http://www.metroweekly.com/poliglot/2011/0
introduced----with-92-few.html. Support for ENDA has increased over time, but ENDA has
yet to garner sufficient support for passage. See § 2000e-2(a) (referring only to "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin"); Chai R. Feldblum, The Federal Gay Rights Bill: From
Bella to ENDA, in CREATING CHANGE: SEXUALITY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 149,
178-87 (John D'Emilio et al. eds., 2000).
29 N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 296 (McKinney 2010).
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exemption.3 0 Under this exemption, a religious organization or affiliated nonprofit retains the right to discriminate in favor of its own adherents in employment and housing decisions and to "tak[e] such
action as is calculated . . . to promote the religious principles for
which it is established . . . ."31 This language exactly tracks the lan-

guage of the broader religious exemption attached to New York's Marriage Equality Act. 3 2 Therefore, we can look to state court precedent
interpreting New York's employment nondiscrimination law to inform
our understanding of the similar exemption attached to the Marriage
Equality Act.
New York courts have never fully explicated the exact scope of
this seemingly broad religious exemption found within the state's
nondiscrimination statute, and case law is scant. However, in Scheiber
v. St. John's University,3 3 the New York Court of Appeals offered some
guidance. In that case, a university denied that it had discriminated
against the plaintiff based on his religion but asserted that, even if it
had, it would have been entitled to do so under the religious exemption.3 4 The court rejected that argument:
[T]he exemption operates to exclude from the definition of "discrimination" exercise of a preference in hiring for persons of the
same faith where that action is calculated by the institution to effectuate its
religious mission. A religious employer may not discriminate against

an individual for reasons having nothing to do with the free exercise of religion and then invoke the exemption as a shield against its
unlawful conduct.3 5
Thus, despite a disjunctive "or" in the statute,36 the court interpreted
this "calculation clause" as restrictive of the general exemption rather
than as an exemption in its own right.
The religious exemption language in the Marriage Equality Act
that diverges from the extant nondiscrimination law provides that re30

Id. § 296(11).

31
32

Id.

Compare id. ("Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to bar any [religious organization] from limiting employment or sales or rental of housing accommodations or
admission to or giving preference to persons of the same religion or denomination orfrom taking such
action as is calculated by such organizationto promote the religious principlesfor which it is established or maintained." (emphasis added)), with Act ofJune 24, 2011, ch. 96, 2011 N.Y. Sess.
Laws 751, 751 (McKinney) ("[Niothing in this article shall ... limit employment or sales or
rental of housing accommodations or admission to or give preference to persons of the same religion or
denominationorfrom taking such action as is calculatedby such organization to promote the religious
principlesfor which it is established or maintained." (emphasis added)).
33 638 N.E.2d 977 (N.Y. 1994).
3
Id. at 980.
35 Id. (emphasis added).
36 N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 296(11) (McKinney 2010) ("or from taking such action as is calculated by such organization to promote the religious principles for which it is established or
maintained" (emphasis added)).
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ligious groups, affiliated nonprofits, and employees thereof "shall not
be required to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for the solemnization or celebration of a marriage. Any such refusal . .. shall not create any civil claim or cause of
action or result in any state or local government action to penalize"
such a religious group or affiliated nonprofit. 7 This language is new
to New York law, so there is no case law to turn to;38 yet, a close reading of the text suggests at least three troublesome implications.
First, the language exempts eligible entities from being required
to "solemniz[e] or celebrat[e]" a marriage. 9 It is entirely unclear
how broadly courts may interpret this language. For example, during
the push for the religious exemptions and following the bill's passage,
religious interest groups and pundits cited fears that state agencies
would pull funding from religious charities that refuse to place children with adoptive gay and lesbian parents. 40 Could such a decision
be viewed as an impermissible penalty by state agencies in response to
a refusal to provide services that solemnize or celebrate a marriage?
Second, the language exempts "any employee" of a religious organization or affiliated nonprofit from being required to solemnize or
celebrate a marriage. 4 ' Imagine that the religious organization employer freely solemnizes and celebrates same-sex marriages, but an individual employee refuses to participate. Is that employee protected
from civil liability by the exemption?4 2
37
38

N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw

§

10-b (McKinney 2012).

Similar exemptions on the books in Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Vermont
were the likely inspiration for the New York language. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-35a
(2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 457:37

(2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,

§ 4502(1)

(Supp.

2011). However, as of this writing, there are no reported cases in any of those states interpreting the language of their respective exemptions.
39
40

Dom. REL. § 10-b.
See, e.g., John Hayward, The Future of Marriage,HuMAN EVEmrs (June 27, 2011, 2:50

PM), http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=44494 ("For that matter, how can religious exemptions, such as those included in the New York bill, be allowed to stand? No
religious belief can be allowed to trump a basic human right for very long. Already Catholic Charities, among the oldest adoption agencies in the country, has been forced out of
the adoption business due to its refusal to place children with same-sex couples in Massachusetts.");

Michael Hill, NY Gay-Marriage Talks Hinge on Religious Rights, SEATTLE

77 3
TIMES (June 22, 2011, 2:45 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/201539 4
apusgaymarriagereligion.html?syndication=rss (noting that "the Catholic establishment in
New York, which opposes the bill, was worried that its adoption agencies might close down"
and citing instances of Catholic adoption agencies in Illinois and Massachusetts shutting
down rather than comply with state nondiscrimination laws).

41

42

DOM. REL. § 10-b.
For example, suppose that a church employs a person to manage a church-owned

banquet facility. Despite the church's doctrinal approval of same-sex marriage, the banquet hall manager refuses to accommodate same-sex couples. If there were no religious
exemption, the manager would be liable under N.Y. ExEC. LAw § 296(2) (a), which makes
it unlawful for a "manager" of a place of public accommodation, inter alia, to refuse accommodations to a person because of sexual orientation. Does the manager's mere status as
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Third, the exemption allows eligible entities to refuse to provide
privileges to solemnize or celebrate a "marriage" 4 3 -any mariage, not
just a same-sex marriage. Does this language then serve to exempt
eligible entities from penalties by state and local agencies if they, for
instance, refused to provide health benefits to an employee's spouse
in an interracial marriage? This scenario is explored in Part II.
II
HYPOTHETICAL SOURCES OF INVALIDATION

A potential source of invalidation 4 4 flows from the marriage exemption allowing organizations and their employees to refuse privileges to celebrate a "marriage."4 5 Imagine that a religion called the
Church of Yesteryear Racists (CYR) operates a banquet hall frequently
used for wedding receptions but openly refuses to allow its use for
interracial marriages because interracial marriages go against CYR's
religion. An interracial couple sues CYR under New York's Human
Rights Law for withholding the use of a public accommodation because of race.4 6 Before the Marriage Equality Act, the interracial
couple would have prevailed. While the religious exemptions in the
Human Rights Law allow organizations to discriminate in favor of
their own religious adherents in limited circumstances, those exemptions do not permit discrimination based on race.47
However, the religious exemptions in the Marriage Equality Act
now allow religious organizations, "notwithstanding any state ... law,"
to refuse to provide accommodations to celebrate a marriage, period.4 8 A court facing the question would have two choices: (1) hold
that religious organizations, affiliated nonprofits, and their employees
are now permitted to discriminate based on race in matters related to
the celebration of a marriage; or (2) construe the marriage exemptions as inapplicable to refusals to provide accommodations based on
race. Option 1 has many obviously undesirable consequences and is
an employee of a religious organization shield against liability despite the fact that the
manager's discriminatory acts are in accordance with personal beliefs-or perhaps even
whimsy and caprice-and not those of the religious employer?
43
Dom. REL. § 10-b.
44 This scenario relies heavily upon a hypothetical originally posed by Michael Dorf.
See Dorf, supra note 3.
45 See Dom. REL. § 10-b.
46
See N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 296(2)(a) (McKinney 2010).

47 See id. § 296(11); N.Y. Att'y Gen., Formal Op. No. 86-F8, 1986 N.Y. Op. Att'y Gen.
29, 31 (N.Y.A.G.) ("Religious organizations are not exempt from the prohibitions in the
Federal and State anti-discrimination laws against discrimination based on race, color or
national origin.").
48

Dom. REL.

§

10-b.
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completely contrary to every indication of legislative intent.4 9 Option
2 comports with what senators who voted "yes" on the exemptions
probably supposed they were voting for-exemptions to protect religious organizations from being forced to celebrate same-sex marriages.
Option 2, however, invites further litigation. Presumably, similar
results would follow if the Church of He-Man Woman-Haters refused
to allow the wife in an opposite-sex couple to sign the banquet hall
rental agreement, or if the Church of the Real America forbade naturalized citizens to adopt children at their affiliated agency. Now we
have an exemption scheme that allows organizations to discriminate
based on sexual orientation in providing accommodations to celebrate marriage but does not allow discrimination on the basis of race,
sex, or national origin. This is closer to what the legislators probably
thought they were voting for,5 0 but it poses two potential constitutional problems.
First, same-sex couples could sue to strike down the exemptions,
as interpreted, as a deprivation of equal protection of the laws under
the Fourteenth Amendment.5 1 Like the statute the U.S. Supreme
Court struck down in Romer v. Evans,5 2 the exemption as construed
effectively "withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal
protection from the injuries caused by discrimination."53 Of course,
49 SeeJohn F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REv. 2387, 2389-90 (2003)
("[L]egislative intent is widely assumed to be the touchstone of statutory interpretation.
While the enacted text is generally considered the best evidence of such intent, Congress
does not always accurately reduce its intentions to words because legislators necessarily
draft statutes within the constraints of bounded foresight, limited resources, and imperfect
language. The absurdity doctrine builds on that idea: If a given statutory application
sharply contradicts commonly held social values, then the Supreme Court presumes that
this absurd result reflects imprecise drafting that Congress could and would have corrected
had the issue come up during the enactment process." (footnote omitted)). In available
media reports of the negotiations and in the senators' own statements explaining their
votes, it is nowhere suggested that the religious exemptions would permit the refusal of
accommodations for marriages other than same-sex marriages. Compare this, however,
with the views of Senator Stephen Saland:
[W]e start off with 'Notwithstanding any state, local or municipal law rule,
regulation, ordinance or other provision of law to the contrary' . . . And
what is the purpose of that? The purpose is to ensure that there shall be no
local law or no other law of this state that might be in conflict with this law
that would supersede the [religious exemptions] that are provided in this
chapter. Concerns had been expressed that there might be municipal action,... there might be the possibility of conflicts with other provisions of
law. Clearly the purpose here is to ensure that whatever conflicts there
might be, those conflicts are resolved in favor of the [religious exemption].
N.Y. State S., Reg. Sess., OPEN LEaIs. (June 24, 2011), http://open.nysenate.gov/legisla
tion/transcript/regular-session-06-24-2011 (session transcript) (statement of Sen. Stephen
Saland)).
5o
See id.
51 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
52
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
53
Id. at 627.
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there are many ways to distinguish this hypothetical from Romer, but
fifteen years have passed since the Court last dealt with the Equal Protection Clause and sexual orientation as a class.5 4 It is at least plausible that a court would find the same-sex couple's argument credible.5 5
Second, CYR and its misogynist and xenophobic likenesses might
argue that the law effectively enacts a shield for one type of religionthose that disapprove of homosexuality-and that it withholds this
shield from religions featuring other doctrines in conflict with New
York's Human Rights Law. CYR could argue that this favoritism violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.5 6
III
THE INSEVERABILITY QUAGMIRE

A.

The Legal Landscape

An inseverability clause is a subset of a class of statutory clauses
that have been termed "fallback law."5 7 Whenever a court finds a statute partially unconstitutional, it must choose whether to sever the in54 The only significant discussion by the Court of the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to sexual orientation is contained in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), in
which the majority declined to analyze the issue under an equal protection analysis, opting
to strike down the law under due process analysis instead. Id. at 574-75, 578-79. Notably,
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor stated in her concurrence that she would have invalidated
the anti-sodomy statute at issue under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 579 (O'Connor,

J., concurring).
55 In 1996, when Romer was decided, a nationwide opinion poll put support of legal
recognition of same-sex marriages at 27% in favor and 68% opposed. See Frank Newport,
Half of Americans Support Legal Gay Marriage, GALLUP (May 8, 2012), http://www.gallup.
The same poll in
com/poll/154529/Half-Americans-Support-Legal-Gay-Marriage.aspx.
2012 reported support at 50% and opposition at 48%. Id. While the Court typically avoids
admitting it, such dramatic changes in public opinion can and do influence the Court.
Justice Kennedy hinted as much in the majority opinion in Lawrence,noting the "emerging
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex," as evidenced in part by gay rights
advances in many U.S. states and Western nations. 539 U.S. at 572-73. Justice O'Connor's
stare decisis analysis in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey is also revealing, noting that a decision to overturn precedent is "comprehensible as the Court's
response to facts that the country could understand, or had come to understand already, but
which the Court of an earlier day, as its own declarations disclosed, had not been able to
perceive." 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992) (emphasis added). Notably, the Lawrence majority was
centrally concerned that criminalizing same-sex sexual conduct was "an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres."
539 U.S. at 575. Between the language in Lawrence, the opinion in Romer, and the ongoing
change of public opinion toward gays and lesbians, it seems plausible that the Court would
look skeptically on a legal regime which specifically withdraws antidiscrimination protection from homosexuals while leaving the protection of other classifications intact.
U.S. CONST. amend. I; see McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 875-76
56
(2005) ("[T]he principle of neutrality has provided a good sense of direction: the government may not favor one religion over another .. . .").
5
See Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 303, 303, 339-40 (2007).
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valid part or to strike down the whole.5 8 In an effort to wrest some
control over the severability decision from courts, legislators have
from time to time codified their preference into law. The most common fallback provision is a severability clause, providing that if a court
strikes down part of the statute, the rest shall remain intact.5 9
However, when faced with statutes containing severability clauses,
courts do not treat them as sacrosanct.6 0 The leading Supreme Court
case is Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Commission of Oklahoma,6 1 in
which the Court held that a drilling statute was partially unconstitutional. The Court explicated the general test that a statute is only
inseverable if "it is evident that the legislature would not have enacted
those provisions which are within its power, independently of that
which is not."6 2 The statute at issue contained a severability clause,
but the court treated it as a mere rebuttable presumption, and was
only satisfied that severability was proper after determining that the
remainder of the statute would be functional to achieve its purpose
standing alone. 3 More than three decades later, the Court noted in
United States v. Jackson that "the ultimate determination of severability
will rarely turn on the presence or absence of such a clause."6 4
The Court confronted the issue of severability again in INS v.
Chadha,which considered whether an unconstitutional legislative veto
provision was severable from the rest of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 65 Again, the Court refused to accept a severability clause
uncritically, choosing instead to examine the legislative history of the
statute to decide whether the record supported severability and
whether the surviving remainder would be "fully operative" as a "workable administrative mechanism."66
When a federal court partially invalidates a state statute, the question of severability is one of state law. 6 7 Unsurprisingly, the courts of
several states, 6 8 including New York,69 have adopted an approach to
58
See infra pp. 196-200.
59 Dorf, supra note 57, at 303.
60
See, e.g., id. at 306 ("If a fallback provision itself has constitutional defects, then
those defects render the fallback invalid.").
61 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
62 Id. at 234.
63 Id. at 235-36.
64 390 U.S. 570, 585 n.27 (1968).
65
462 U.S. 919, 931-35 (1983).
66
Id. at 934-35.
67 Nat'l Adver. Co. v. Town of Niagara, 942 F.2d 145, 148 (2d Cir. 1991).
68
See Friedman, supra note 2, at 906 n.16 (citing cases from Illinois, NewJersey, and
Washington, which treat severability clauses as mere presumptions rebuttable by evidence
of contrary legislative intent).
69
See People v. Mancuso, 175 N.E. 177, 180 (N.Y. 1931) ("The question is in every
case whether the Legislature, if partial invalidity had been foreseen, would have wished the
statute to be enforced with the invalid part exscinded, or rejected altogether." (internal
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severability clauses similar to the Supreme Court's approach in federal
cases. However, in New York, cases interpreting even these relatively
common provisions have been rare, and federal courts have decided
most of the cases by applying state law. 70 The New York Court of Appeals has laid down this general standard on severability:
The principle of division is not a principle of form. It is a principle
of function. The question is in every case whether the Legislature,
if partial invalidity had been foreseen, would have wished the statute
to be enforced with the invalid part exscinded, or rejected altogether. The answer must be reached pragmatically, by the exercise
of good sense and sound judgment, by considering how the statutory rule will function if the knife is laid to the branch, instead of at
the roots.7 1
Thus, apart from legislative intent, of primary importance is whether
the remaining legislation will be able to function independently; if
not, then a court should not sever even in the presence of a severability clause.7 2 One court remarked that severability clauses represent "a
narrow exception to the general rule that, when a clause is unambiguous, construction is unnecessary."7 3
In a sense, any judicial invalidation of a statute results in the implementation of a substitutive provision, since whether the law is partially or wholly struck down, the void it leaves is filled by the
background law that remains. A few scholars have argued that all laws
should effectively be construed to have an inseverability clause because this would minimize the extent to which judges can "rewrite the
laws" by striking only portions of them. According to this view, adopting a blanket doctrine of inseverability would preserve legislative in-

quotation marks omitted)); St. Joseph Hosp. of Cheektowaga v. Novello, 840 N.Y.S.2d 263,
269 (App. Div. 2007) (citing Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686 (1987)) (holding that the severability clause created a "presumption" of legislative intent for
severability).
70
See Nat'l Adver. Co., 942 F.2d at 148; Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Town Bd. of
Windham, 352 F. Supp. 2d 297, 311 (N.D.N.Y. 2005); 801 Conklin St. Ltd. v. Town of
Babylon, 38 F. Supp. 2d 228, 245-46 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); N. Shore Concrete & Assocs. v. City
of New York, No. 94 CV. 4017, 1998 WL 273027, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. April 12, 1998).
71
People ex rel. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Knapp, 129 N.E. 202, 207 (N.Y. 1920).
72
Natl Adver. Co., 942 F.2d at 148 (citing N.Y. State Superfund Coal., Inc. v. N.Y. State
Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 550 N.E.2d 155, 157 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that despite severability clause in regulation, severing was inappropriate because disputed standard was at
"the core" of and "interwoven inextricably" through the entire scheme)).
73
Stiens v. Fire & Police Pension Ass'n, 684 P.2d 180, 184 n.12 (Colo. 1984).
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tent and incentivize lawmakers to comply with constitutional norms. 7 4
However, courts have not adopted such a blanket doctrine.7 5
The inseverability clause is a much rarer species of fallback law
than the severability clause.76 Most states have enacted, by statute or
by canons of interpretation, the presumption of statutory severability. 77 One might think, then, that legislatures would only need to express their preference when that preference is inseverability rather
than severability. Moreover, as we shall see, inseverability clauses are
potentially much more powerful tools than severability clauses, raising
the question of whether the two should be treated the same.
One approach is to treat an inseverability clause as the logical
inverse of a severability clause. 78 This approach treats an inseverability clause as merely a different preference the legislature can express regarding the severability question. While case law is scarce,
several courts have adopted this "mirror image" approach. In Biszko v.
RTHT Financial Corp.,79 the First Circuit adopted the Chadha analysis
but applied it to an inseverability clause, concluding that the clause
created no more than a presumption of inseverability that could be
overcome with evidence of legislative intent.8 0 The Colorado Supreme Court, likewise, applied its severability analysis to an inseverability clause in Stiens v. Fire 6f Police Pension Ass'n.8 '
74 See Tom Campbell, Severability of Statutes, 62 HASTINGs L.J. 1495, 1525 (2011); David
H. Gans, Severability asJudicialLawmaking, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 639, 675 (2008); cf Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Nat'l Fed'n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)
(No. 11-393), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument
transcripts/11-393.pdf ("When you say judicial restraint, you are echoing the ... premise
that it increases the judicial power if the judiciary strikes down other provisions of the Act.
I suggest to you it might be quite the opposite.. . . [W]e would have a new regime that
Congress did not provide for, did not consider. That . . . can be argued at least to be a
more extreme exercise of judicial power . . . than striking the whole.").
75
See e.g., Nat'lAdver. Co., 942 F.2d at 148 (citing Alpha PortlandCement Co., 129 N.E. at
207) ("As a general rule, a court should refrain from invalidating an entire statute when
only portions of it are objectionable.").
76
Michael D. Shumsky, Severability, Inseverability, and the Rule of Law, 41 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 227, 243 (2004) ("[I]nseverability clauses have not featured as prominently in the
development of the current doctrine. This can probably be attributed to the . . . fact[ J
that Congress only occasionally enacts such clauses . . . ." (footnote omitted)); see alsoJohn
Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REv. 203, 251 n.235 (1993) (noting that there have
been vastly more federal cases discussing severability clauses compared with the very few
discussing inseverability clauses).
77
See, e.g., Alpha Portland Cement Co., 129 N.E. at 208 ("Our right to destroy is
bounded by the limits of necessity. Our duty is to save, unless in saving we pervert."); see
also Nagle, supra note 76, at 251-52 (discussing congressional expectations of severability).
78
For a general overview and criticism of this approach, see Friedman, supra note 2,
at 907-13.
79
758 F.2d 769 (1st Cir. 1985).
80 Id. at 773 ("[A] non-severability clause cannot ultimately bind a court, it establishes
a presumption of non-severability." (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983))).
81
684 P.2d 180, 184 (Colo. 1984) ("The special unseverability clause ... is not conclusive as to legislative intent. It gives rise only to a presumption that, if the unconstitutional
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The U.S. Supreme Court, by contrast, has largely managed to
avoid in-depth discussion of the deference that should be afforded
inseverability clauses. In Zobel v. Williams, the Court discussed an inseverability clause in dicta:
Invalidation of a portion of a statute does not necessarily render the
whole invalid unless it is evident that the legislature would not have
enacted the legislation without the invalid portion. Here, we need
not speculate as to the intent of the Alaska Legislature; the legislation expressly provides that invalidation of any portion of the statute
renders the whole invalid .... 82
In Zobel, the court invalidated a scheme that paid dividends from a
state mineral fund to state residents in an amount proportionate to
each resident's duration of residency."" The Court held that feature-the differential based on the duration of residency-to be unconstitutional.8 4 Despite the language quoted above, the Court
remanded the severability question to the Alaska courts.85
B.

Theoretical Challenges

Israel Friedman convincingly argues that inseverablity clauses are
fundamentally different from severability clauses and that, as such,
courts should not treat them similarly, let alone as "mirror images" of
each other.8 6 Severability clauses are common, so much so that scholars and legislators alike refer to them as "boilerplate."87 They are
hardly negotiated, but rather are inserted into complex bills as a perfunctory matter to preserve the tree when a bough here or there
breaks. Inseverablity clauses, by contrast, are exceptional and are the
product of heavy negotiation. 8 They often reflect ajockeying of position among competing interest groups and political factions, the natural product of legislative logrolling. As such, Friedman argues, they
represent a more forceful expression of legislative intent and thus
should not be treated as a mere rebuttable presumption but as strictly
binding.8 9
Along the same lines, Friedman argues that amidst this self-interested chaos, inseverability clauses serve as a valuable tool to reach legparts of an Act were eliminated, the legislature would not have been satisfied with what
remained." (citations omitted)).
82 Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 64-65 (1982) (citations omitted).
83 Id. at 56.
84 Id. at 65.
85 Id.
86 See Friedman, supra note 2, at 907-13.
87
Id. at 910.
88
Id. at 910-13.
89 See id. at 913-18.
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islative compromise.9 0 In contract negotiations, parties frequently
manifest an intent that some term or other is so essential, so material,
that it is inseverable from the rest. Similarly, inseverability clauses
function as insurance for legislators negotiating a legislative deal, ensuring the survival of the compromise such that one party does not
enjoy their benefit of the bargain while the other is deprived byjudicial invalidation.9 '
However, there must be some limits on the use of inseverability
clauses, and on the broader class of fallback law in general, because it
is not hard to imagine how the clauses might be used as coercive
tools. 92 For example, suppose that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) had included a provision stating that if any
part of the act shall be found invalid, all provisions in the Code relating to health-including those establishing the Department of Health
and Human Services, Medicare, and Medicaid-are thereby repealed.9 3 It would be hard not to infer that Congress had intended to
coerce courts into upholding the PPACA and did not really want all
health legislation repealed.
Intuitively, there is something problematic about legislatures coercing courts in this way. However, a thoughtful analysis reveals something of a paradox. In our example, if Congress had instead
announced its intention to repeal all health laws in the event the
courts invalidated the PPACA, it is difficult to imagine a constitutional
problem. Congress could, acting within the powers vested in it by the
Constitution, repeal all federal health laws for any number of reasons,
or no reason at all. However, such a repeal would have to survive
political blowback directed at Congress as well as a potential presidential veto. So the threat itself is not the problem; rather, it is the aspect
of making the threat self-executing that gives us pause, and for good
reason. Making the consequence self-executing forces the judiciary to
suffer the political backlash for exercising its sound constitutional
judgment. It also obviates the necessity for Congress to muster the
political will to follow through on its threat and for the President to
sign the bill into law.

90

Id. at 914-17.

91

See id.

92 See generally Dorf, supra note 57, at 327-42 (exploring the use of fallbacks "as a
means of coercing courts into resolving close constitutional questions in favor of the challenged legislation" and proposing several germaneness tests to detect coercive fallbacks);
Kameny, supra note 5, at 997-1000, 1016-28 (identifying subtypes of coercive inseverability
clauses and proposing a good faith test rooted in nondelegation principles to detect coercive inseverability clauses).
93 See Dorf, supra note 57, at 333-36 (providing an in-depth analysis of a similar hypothetical coercive fallback).
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Fred Kameny proposes two illegitimate types of inseverability
clauses. 9 4 First, "in terrorem clauses" are used when a legislature
wishes to coerce a reviewing court into upholding a suspect provision
by making the consequences of total invalidation too severe to countenance. 95 Our example above with the PPACA is an example of this
type of coercive inseverability clause. Kameny's second type of illegitimate inseverability clauses, "poison-pill clauses," refers to an inseverability clause inserted by legislators who actually oppose a statute,
expect that it is at least partially unconstitutional, and hope that a
court will exercise its duty, triggering the inseverability clause and invalidating the entire act.9 6
Inseverability clauses can arguably serve proper purposes.9 7 For
instance, a legislature might use an inseverability clause if it fears that
partial judicial invalidation would leave a law unworkable. Alternately,
the legislature might fear that partial invalidation would leave a law
that it would not have adopted absent the invalid portion.
Nevertheless, inseverability clauses present problems independent of improper legislative motive or purpose. For example, regardless of their underlying motive, they limit judicial power and
discretion in a way that severability clauses do not. Severability clauses
merely express the legislature's intent to save whatever part of the statute can be saved in the event of judicial invalidation. They do not
purport to deprive courts of their discretion to invalidate the entire
statute-a power inherent in the power of judicial review. Inseverability clauses, by contrast, instruct the court to invalidate the entire
statute when a part of it is problematic, without regard to the relationship between the invalid portion and the lawful remainder. This feature may render some inseverability clauses unconstitutional under
principles of nondelegation and separation of powers.9 8
C. Practical Challenges
There are a number of practical problems often left unresolved
by the drafters of inseverability clauses.9 9 Suppose a legislature enacts
a statute with a clause that reads: "Ifany part of Xshall be adjudged by
a court to be invalid, then the law shall thereafter be Y." First, individuals affected by this statute would face difficulty in structuring their
affairs without assurance of whether X or Ywill be the law going for94 Kameny, supra note 5, at 1000-01 (introducing these subtypes of coercive inseverability clauses).
95
Id. at 1001.
96 Id. at 1001-02.
97
Id. at 1000.
98
Id. at 1003.
99
For a discussion of similar issues regarding fallback law in general, see Dorf, supra
note 57, at 352-69.
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ward. An individual who acted on the assumption that X was valid
prior to a ruling triggering a reversion to Y might face legal consequences that a court would then have to unravel. 0 0
Second, inseverability clauses frequently fail to specify which
court's decision to invalidate will be sufficient to trigger the clause.101
In the case of a state statute X, if a federal court strikes down part of X
on state law grounds, does this revert the law to Y even though a state
court might hold otherwise in the future? If a trial court strikes down
X, does this revert the law to Y immediately even though appeals
might be forthcoming? If it does not revert the law to Yimmediately,
are the constitutional portions of X binding upon individuals and officials pending the exhaustion of appeals? Can a trial court's decision
to invalidate X, triggering reversion to Y,affect persons not parties to
the case, even though trial decisions are not binding precedent and
even though due process prohibits trial decisions from having preclusive effect on nonparties? 0 2
Third, if a court holds that part of X is unconstitutional only as
applied, should that holding trigger reversion to ? If so, would this
not overshoot legislative intent by reverting to the second-best law, Y,
even in cases in which X is constitutional?
Fourth, suppose that a plaintiff challenges an unconstitutional
provision of X and alleges an injury, but reversion to Y would harm
any plaintiff so injured even more. To have Article III standing, a
plaintiffs injury must be redressable by a favorable ruling. 0 3 In this
scenario, it is not clear how such a plaintiff could meet the
requirement.
D.

Challenges Posed by the Inseverability Clause in New York's
Marriage Equality Act

Each of the theoretical and practical challenges outlined above
finds some expression in the Marriage Equality Act's inseverability
clause. A full exploration of these difficulties is beyond the scope of
100 See id. at 355-56.
101 See id. at 356-58. The inseverability clause in New York's Marriage Equality Act is
one such clause. See Act of June 24, 2011, ch. 96, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 751, 752
(McKinney).
1o2 See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 884 (2008) ("It is a principle of general
application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in
personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been
made a party by service of process." (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
103
E.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) ("[Al litigant must demonstrate that it has suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is either actual or imminent, that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant, and that it is likely that a favorable
decision will redress that injury." (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560-61 (1992))).
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this Note, but a sketch of their application to the New York statute
seems warranted; many are explored further in Part IV.
On the one hand, the Marriage Equality Act's inseverability
clause appears to be the result of a thorough negotiating process
rather than a mere boilerplate insertion.1 04 The record discloses little
to indicate that any senator intended the clause to function as an "in
terrorem clause" or a "poison-pill clause."1 05 And it is true that the
New York legislature might not have passed the Act without the inclusion of religious exemptions and the inseverability clause.1 06
Nevertheless, the inseverability clause strips courts of the ability
to exercise a constitutional judgment on the religious exemptions and
at the same time leave same-sex marriage intact. A court must choose
between upholding the religious exemptions or voiding same-sex marriage. A judge choosing the latter course would bear the political
backlash for effectively repealing same-sex marriage-blame that
would rightfully belong with the legislature.' 0 7 Arguably, this is "analogous to the power of robbery victims to choose between giving up
their money and giving up their lives."10 8 There is a very real danger
that a judge faced with this choice would eschew exercising constitutional judgment regarding the religious exemptions. Therefore, any
judicial response should account for the fact that an inseverability
clause may ordain a problematic coercive effect even in the absence of
coercive intent.
See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
But see Skelos, supra note 17 ("You could have a federal judge come in, knock out all
the religious protections and . .. still have the gay marriage. So we're working to protect
religious protections to make sure that they are solid and that they will stand.").
106
See Danny Hakim, Exemptions Were Key to Vote on Gay Mariage, N.Y. TIMES, June 26,
2011, at A20.
107
One might ask what form this political backlash could take against an unelected
judiciary. We might begin by remembering the admonition of Alexander Hamilton that
the judiciary is "the least dangerous" of the three branches, because it holds "no influence
over either the sword or the purse." THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (McLean ed. 1788). Justice O'Connor expanded on this point in Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey: "The Court's power lies ... in its legitimacy, a product of
substance and perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance of the Judiciary as fit
to determine what the Nation's law means and to declare what it demands." 505 U.S. 833,
865 (1992). This function, as Alexander Bickel notes, includes not only the power to
check unconstitutional legislative acts but also to legitimate constitutional ones. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POUT.
Ics 29 (2d ed. 1986). By forcing a court to take the statute as a whole or reject it entirely,
an inseverability clause deprives it of the ability to tailor the "substance and perception"
evoked by its opinions in a way that safeguards its legitimacy in the eyes of the public. It is
forced to choose between legitimating the unconstitutional and striking down the constitutional. While lawyers may understand a theoretical basis for forcing this choice, many lay
observers will doubtlessly perceive only the end result. This perception can only serve to
chip away at the judiciary's continued legitimacy as the public witnesses the Court striking
down the clearly legitimate or letting stand the clearly unconstitutional.
108
Kameny, supra note 5, at 1021.
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IV
POTENTIAL JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO A TRIGGERED
INSEVERABILITY CLAUSE

A.

The Plain Meaning Approach

The most obvious response to a triggered inseverability clause is
to simply apply its plain meaning.10 9 In the case of New York's Marriage Equality Act, a judge might easily conclude that inseverability
clauses express the unambiguous intent of the legislature and that a
court should always honor that intent.
There is significant theoretical weight to this position. Courts
have traditionally treated severability clauses as mere rebuttable presumptions.o10 However, legislatures often insert severability clauses as
"boilerplate" in an effort to preserve the tree even if a few branches
are pruned.1 1 ' In contrast, inseverability clauses are rare, and legislators typically negotiate them heavily,'" 2 a fact exemplified by the negotiations leading to the passage of the Marriage Equality Act.)' 3 Thus,
the inseverability clause in the Marriage Equality Act arguably
presents a more forceful expression of legislative intent that a judge
should hesitate to scrutinize.
Moreover, inseverability clauses arguably serve a useful and legitimate function in facilitating the legislative bargaining process." 4 In
the case of the Marriage Equality Act, passage of the final bill required
several Republican votes.' 15 Available evidence raises the inference
that one or more of those necessary Republican senators extracted the
inseverability clause as a necessary condition of their vote in an effort
to protect their benefit of the bargain-namely, the religious exemptions.' 1 6 This narrative comports with the approach of public choice
theorists who view statutes as the result of multiple interested groups
asserting their self-interests through lobbying and legislative harangu109 See generally Friedman, supra note 2, at 917-23 (advocating that inseverability
clauses be scrupulously honored by distinguishing them from severability clauses); Shumsky, supra note 76 at 245-71 (arguing that both severability and inseverability clauses be
enforced according to their plain meaning).
110 See supra notes 61-73 and accompanying text.
111 Friedman, supra note 2, at 910; Shumsky, supra note 76, at 246.
112 Friedman, supra note 2, at 911-12 ("Inseverability clauses, on the other hand, are
anything but boilerplate. . . . [TJhey are strategically designed to ensure that the legislation does not exist without its most fundamental provisions." (footnote omitted)); Shumsky, supra note 76, at 267 ("[N] one of the arguments for disregarding severability clauses
applies in the inseverability context. Such clauses are far from boilerplate, suggesting that
Congress really does know what it is doing when it includes such a directive.").
113 See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
114
115

See Friedman, supra note 2, 914-17.

See Barbaro, supra note 9 (describing Governor Cuomo's efforts to "win over the
deciding Senate Republicans").
116 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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ing.' 1 7 Thus, the Marriage Equality Act can be viewed as a contract
between Governor Cuomo and Democratic supporters of marriage
equality on the one hand and a few Republicans who were willing to
switch sides only if religious interests could be sufficiently protected
on the other.' 18 In this view, the inseverability clause may have served
a vital enforcement function, without which an optimal compromise
might not have been possible.11 9 In other words, the clause served to
ease the minds of those Republican senators whose late-hour defection secured final passage of the bill.120 Thus, any criticism of inseverability must contend with the argument that without the availability of
the inseverability clause as a drafting tool, same-sex marriage might
have remained a pipe dream in New York.
Furthermore, this plain meaning approach would avoid the necessity of looking beyond the statute's text to divine legislative history
or intent, which is a problematic enterprise in light of a frequently
sparse record. The Marriage Equality Act exemplifies this problem.
Other than the legislative intent section of the session law1'2 and statements made by some senators as they were casting their votes,' 2 2 there
is little publicly available information on the details of the negotiating
process. 123
The legislative intent section of the final session law includes the
following language:
Marriage is a fundamental human right. Same-sex couples should
have the same access as others to the protections, responsibilities,
rights, obligations, and benefits of civil marriage. Stable family relationships help build a stronger society. For the welfare of the community and in fairness to all New Yorkers, this act formally
recognizes otherwise-valid marriages without regard to whether the
parties are of the same or different sex.' 24
How could a court begin to reconcile this language with the clear
meaning of the inseverability clause? If marriage-including same-sex
marriage-is a "fundamental human right,"'2 5 then how can it be the
intent of the legislature to repeal it upon invalidation of even a minor
provision of the bill?
117

118
119

See Friedman, supra note 2, 918.
See id.; Barbaro, supra note 9.
See Hakim, supra note 106.

See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
Marriage Equality Act, ch. 95, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 749, 749 (McKinney).
See, e.g., supra notes 10, 18, 20; infra note 143.
Indeed, the negotiating process took place largely behind closed doors. Opponents of same-sex marriage have even challenged the propriety of these closed-door meetings under New York's open meetings law. See N.Y. Pus. OFF. IAw §§ 100-11 (McKinney
2010); Kaplan, supra note 22.
124
Marriage Equality Act, ch. 95, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 749, 749 (McKinney).
125
Id.
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On the other hand, the Senate Majority Leader who allowed a
floor vote on the bill and at least one key senator voting for passage
explicitly cited the inseverability clause as a crucial component to the
final bill.12 6 So, which intent matters in this inquiry? That of the legislature as stated in the statute or that of the few Republican senators
whose actions were the marginal lynchpin to securing final passage?
Those two intents appear to conflict, and inviting courts to scrutinize
the "legislative intent" behind inseverability ignores the possibility of
conflicting interests engaging in bargaining as outlined above. It may
also undermine the bargaining process in future legislation by reducing the likelihood of useful compromise. Perhaps even more troubling, it might encourage judges to credit the intent they prefer best on
normative, rather than principled, grounds.
B.

The "Mirror Image" Approach

The Supreme Court has treated severability clauses merely as rebuttable presumptions in favor of severing. Even when a severability
clause is present, the Court asks whether "the Legislature would not
have enacted those provisions [of the statute] which are within its
power, independently of that which is not"'2 7 and whether the valid
remainder would function as a workable law.128 A few lower courts
have applied the logical inverse of this test to inseverability clauses,
treating them merely as rebuttable presumptions that "if the unconsti-

tutional parts of an Act were eliminated, the legislature would not
have been satisfied with what remained."' 2 9 Extrinsic evidence of legislative intent, along with inquiries into whether the effects of entire
invalidation would comport with that intent, can thus overcome the
presumption of inseverability. 3 0
This "mirror image" approach has the advantage of avoiding a
significant practical problem with the plain meaning approach, which
can lead to an absurd result: a relatively minor triggering condition
might require a court to invalidate an entire statute of great social
worth. For example, a court might find the Marriage Equality Act's
religious exemptions unconstitutional as disparately applied to a racist
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
127 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976) (per curiam)).
128
See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 934-35 (1983) (finding that § 244 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act is "'fully operative' and workable administrative machinery" without the unconstitutional portion of the statute).
129 Stiens v. Fire & Police Pension Ass'n, 684 P.2d 180, 184 (Colo. 1984) (citing City of
Lakewood v. Colfax Unlimited Ass'n, 634 P.2d 52, 70 (Colo. 1981)); see also Biszko v. RIHT
Fin. Corp., 758 F.2d 769, 773 (1st Cir. 1985) ("Although, as the district court correctly
noted, a non-severability clause cannot ultimately bind a court, it establishes a presumption
of non-severability." (citations omitted)).
130
See Stiens, 684 P.2d at 184.
126
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church compared to an anti-same-sex marriage church as hypothesized in Part II, thus invalidating the whole bill for a reason likely not
contemplated by the drafters of the inseverability clause. If the court
facing such a challenge were to apply the mirror image approach, it
would ask whether the legislature would have intended for a finding
of unconstitutionality under these circumstances to effect repeal of
same-sex marriage in New York.
One proponent of the plain meaning approach argues that the
prospect of an "absurd result" actually serves a valuable function by
forcing legislatures to draft statutes containing inseverability clauses
with greater care and specificity. 3 1 However, this judicial admonishment function would afford little solace to the tens of thousands of
couples whose marriages might be dissolved in the process. Furthermore, a more searching inquiry into inseverability clauses might encourage legislators to draft statutes more faithfully observant of the
limits imposed by the constitutions they have sworn to uphold rather
than using potentially unconstitutional provisions as bargaining chips.
C. The Germaneness Approach
Both the plain meaning and "mirror image" approaches fail to
account for the prospect that a legislature might adopt an inseverability clause for improper-even unconstitutional-reasons. Recognizing this possibility, scholars have advanced alternative approaches
aimed at distinguishing legitimate uses of inseverability clauses from
illegitimate uses.
Michael Dorf has suggested that courts might use a germaneness
test to weed out impermissible inseverability clauses.13 2 He posits this
test by analogy to the requirement that conditions Congress imposes
on state funding must be germane to the purpose of the funded programs. 3 3 By scrutinizing the logical relationship between the legislative goal and the means used to achieve it, we "can 'smoke out'
illegitimate motives"13 4 in a manner similar to the function of heightened scrutiny in other areas of constitutional doctrine. Proceeding
from this view, a court should sever the unconstitutional portion if a
lack of germaneness seems to indicate that the legislature inserted the
inseverability clause for coercive or otherwise illegitimate reasons.
Professor Dorf, in fact, proposed two different formulations of
this germaneness test. The first he modeled on the conditional federal-spending case South Dakota v. Dole,13 5 in which the Supreme Court
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See Friedman, supra note 2, at 922-23.
See Dorf, supra note 57, at 333-39.
Id. at 334-35.
Id. at 335.
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483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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held that conditioning federal highway funds on the adoption by
states of a drinking age of twenty-one "is directly related to one of the
main purposes for which highway funds are expended-safe interstate
travel,"' 3 6 and thus was germane to that purpose.1 3 7 Applied to an
inseverability clause, we would ask whether a condition imposed via an
inseverability clause is related to the purposes for which the conditioned provision was enacted.
His second proposed test is inspired by the scholarship of Lynn
Baker1 38 on the same federal grants issue examined in Dole. Professor
Baker argued for an approach that would permit Congress to impose
requirements on how states spend grant money but would prohibit
Congress from conditioning grants entirely upon the fulfillment of
some external criterion, even if that criterion would advance a purpose similar to the purpose the spending was enacted to advance. 3 9
Adapted to the context of fallback provisions, Professor Dorf formulated this test as follows:
Could Congress plausibly be understood to have intended the
fallback provision either to substitute for the original provision, or
otherwise to take account of a contingency created by the original
provision's invalidation? If the answer is yes, then the fallback
should be deemed germane. If the answer is no, a court should
deem the fallback nongermane, and thus invalid. 140
Professor Dorf ultimately advocated for this second test, concluding
that the first test would be too permissive-in other words, too easy
for legislatures to circumvent through creative drafting.14 1
However, as applied to the inseverability clause and the religious
exemptions in the Marriage Equality Act, the first test would appear to
counsel invalidating the clause as nongermane, while the second test
would advise upholding the clause. The first test would ask whether
conditioning same-sex marriage on the existence of religious exemptions is germane to the purposes for which the legislature enacted
same-sex marriage. By its terms, the marriage statute's avowed purpose was to extend marriage to same-sex couples because "[m]arriage
is a fundamental human right," and thus "[s]ame-sex couples should
have the same access as others to the . . . benefits of civil marriage"

because "[s] table family relationships help build a stronger society." 4 2
Id. at 208 (citation omitted).
See Dorf, supra note 57, at 334-35.
138 See Lynn A. Baker, ConditionalFederalSpending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1911,
1962-63 (1995); Dorf, supra note 57, at 337-38;.
139 See Baker, supra note 138, 1916-18.
140 See Dorf, supra note 57, at 338.
141
See id. at 336-39.
142 Marriage Equality Act, ch. 95, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 749, 749 (McKinney).
136
137
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These legislative goals are in no way aligned with the purposes
behind conditioning same-sex marriage on religious exemptions.
One of the Republicans voting "yes" characterized that purpose as ensuring that "religious aspects and beliefs are protected, as well as for
not-for-profits." 143 Indeed, to the extent that the "benefits of civil
marriage" 144 may devolve from exempted religious organizations,
these purposes seem directly opposed. Thus, the inseverability clause
at issue would fail the first formulation of the germaneness test.
The second germaneness test would first ask whether the legislature could plausibly have intended the effective repeal of same-sex
marriage in the event a court finds the religious exemptions invalid.
The test would alternatively ask whether the legislature intended the
effective repeal of same-sex marriage to take account of a contingency
created by the invalidation of the religious exemptions. The answer
to both questions is "yes." Regardless of whether the senators who
pushed for the inseverability clause imagined it would ever be triggered, their statements at the time of the vote suggest they intended it
to be fully operable in that event.14 5 Moreover, the contingency they
sought to avoid was precisely the scenario of a court invalidating the
religious exemptions while leaving same-sex marriage intact.146
The two tests supply contrary results because they ask different
questions. The first test essentially aims to detect whether an inseverability clause has a coercive effect while the second aims to detect
whether the legislature drafting the inseverability clause harbored a
coercive purpose. Professor Dorf's concern was that it would be "all
too easy for a legislature to fashion a fallback that is intended to be
coercive but nonetheless satisfies" the first test.147 However, his account seems to overlook the problem of a fallback provision that
ordains a coercive effect despite the drafters' innocent purpose.
D.

The Good Faith Approach

Fred Kameny has proposed that courts should refuse to honor an
inseverability clause that a legislature adopts in bad faith.' 4 8 Kameny
formulated his test as follows:
To apply the standard, one must determine whether a legislature
that enacted an inseverable statute was (permissibly) making a policy judgment that no statute at all is better than an emasculated
143
N.Y. State S., Reg. Sess., OPEN LEGIS. (June 24, 2011), http://open.nysenate.gov/
legislation/transcript/regular-session-06-24201 I (session transcript) (statement of Sen.
Mark Grisanti).
144
Marriage Equality Act, ch. 95, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 749, 749 (McKinney).
145
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
146
Id.
147
Dorf, supra note 57, at 337.
148
See Kameny, supra note 5, at 1026-27.
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statute, or rather (impermissibly) strong-arming thejudiciary ... or
engaging in legislative sabotage.' 4 9
To circumvent the problem of whose bad faith controls, Kameny proposed a "but for" test: "without the presence of an improper motive
(i.e., to enact a bill without having made a policy judgment), the bill
would not have passed."o5 0 This approach is similar to Professor
Dorf's second germaneness test discussed above. It relies essentially
on an improper purpose or motive and does not address the dangers
of an innocently drafted inseverability clause that nevertheless operates to coerce the courts.
The inseverability clause in the Marriage Equality Act satisfies this
test for the same reason it satisfies Professor Dorf's second germaneness test. The New York legislature engaged in a protracted bargaining process to achieve the enactment of same-sex marriage, and that
enactment required both that the recalcitrant Republican majority allow the vote to go forward and that a few Republicans vote "yes."15 '
Those Republicans who did defect emphasized the importance of the
exemptions and the inseverability clause,' 5 2 reflecting a policy judgment that if same-sex marriage is to be enacted, it should only be enacted with expanded religious exemptions. There is little indication
that those senators harbored an improper motive-in other words, to
coerce the courts into upholding the religious exemptions if they are
challenged.
CONCLUSION

Applying the plain meaning of an inseverability clause fails in several respects. The plain meaning approach neglects to account for
the insuperable practical difficulties discussed in Part III.C-that the
text of even an artfully drafted inseverability clause will inevitably leave
unresolved. It also fails to afford proper solicitude to the constitutional prerogatives of the judiciary by affording no remedy for coercive inseverability clauses. Insofar as public choice theorists would
like to view the legislative process as a contractual arrangement between competing interest groups, they fail to grasp the full implications of the analogy.
In the case of the Marriage Equality Act, the competing interests
at work in the New York legislature did reach a bargain they found
agreeable, but by inserting the inseverability clause, they externalized
the political costs of their potentially unconstitutional compact, con149
150
151
152

Id. at 1022.
Id. at 1026.
See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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scripting the judiciary as an unwilling partner. In doing so, the legislature impermissibly encroached upon a coequal branch.
A method of detecting impermissible inseverability clauses by requiring good faith or a germane legislative purpose is insufficient for
similar reasons. The invasion of the judicial prerogative to exercise
independent constitutional judgment is no less dangerous when the
trespass is unintentional.
An optimal inquiry would test for coercive effect, not coercive
purpose. Professor Dorf's first germaneness test is a promising approach. This test would refuse to allow legislatures to impose a condition on an enactment that bears no relation to the purpose of that
enactment. In so doing, the test prevents the legislature from requiring the judiciary to bear the political costs of punishing interest group
A for interest group B's unconstitutional demands. Such a requirement is damaging to the judiciary whether or not interest group B
made those demands in good faith.
If the unavailability of the bargain reached in New York would
have resulted in a delay in the enactment of same-sex marriage, then
so be it. In the long run, it is normatively, politically, and constitutionally preferable for the legislature to bear the political costs of its own
shady dealing. In the absence of coercive inseverability, legislative
blocs would still trade votes for amendments; they would simply have
to find another way to induce mutual trust besides foisting dilemmas
of their own making upon the judiciary.

